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INTRODUCTION 
If thinking involves the processing of information it is 
important to know how information can be represented in memo­
ry, how it is represented during processing, and what the 
properties of these processes are. 
One of the first to investigate alternatives to 
linguistic representations of information was Sir Francis 
Galton. Upon evaluating the returns of a questionnaire he 
had sent to "persons of distinction in various kinds of 
intellectual work", he concluded, apparently somewhat to his 
own surprise: "that scientific men as a class have feeble 
powers of visual representation. There is no doubt whatever 
on the latter point, however it may be accounted for" (1880, 
p. 304). 
Maybe visualizing the morning breakfast table, the task 
Galton required his correspondents to perform, involved too 
trivial a subject to be remembered by these illustrious 
minds. The implication of his conclusion, that imaginai rep­
resentation of information may be inconsequential for 
thinking or even incompatible with it, has certainly not gone 
unchallenged. A compatriot of Salton began his article on 
the objective study of mental imagery with the words: "Images 
are the material of thought..." (Short, 1953), and Jacques 
aonod, an outstanding scientific confrere of his, speculated: 
I am sure,every scientist must have noticed how his 
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mental reflection, at a deeper level, is not 
verbal: to be absorbed in thought is to be 
embarked upon an imagined experienced, an experi­
ence simulated with the aid of forms, of forces, of 
interactions which together only barely compose an 
"image" in the visual sense of the term.... Howev­
er, it is not then that the significance of the 
simulated experience comes clear, but only when it 
has been enunciated symbolically (1972, p. 155 f.). 
This abstract representational system that Monod 
characterized negatively - not verbal, hardly visual - could 
be called spatial, in the sense that it allows the coding of 
the relative positions of elements (form) and the change of 
these positions as a consequence of outside factors (forces) 
or the functional relationships between the elements (inter­
actions). In these terms, Monod«s introspections would be 
consistent with Cooper and Shepard's (1 973) statement "that 
the most important and general divisions in cognitive proc­
esses are between entire coherent systems -- perhaps most 
clearly the spatial and the linguistic systems" (p. 79). 
Such a distinction would be supported by the apparent 
separate localization of these two representational systems 
in the two hemispheres of the human brain (e.g. Kimura, 1973; 
Gross, 1972; Galin 6 Ornstein, 1972; Taylor, 1972; Seffen, 
Bradshaw, S Wallace, 1971; Gazzaniga, Bogen S Sperry, 1965). 
While no single study by itself proves that the two 
representational systems are separated anatomically, a wide 
^Emphasis Monod's 
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variety of stimulus materials, paradigms, and measures yield 
results consistent with this notion. 
More important, several recent studies, correlational as 
well as experimental, converge in their conclusion that there 
are mental tasks which induce subjects to encode, store, ma­
nipulate, and retrieve spatial information. 
Gavurin (1967) correlated scores on a spatial abilities 
test (Revised Minnesota Paper Form Board) with a measure of 
performance in a six-letter anagram solution task. One group 
of Ss was permitted to only mentally manipulate the letters 
with a resulting correlation of r = .54 between test and 
anagram scores. The Ss in another group were permitted to 
concretely manipulate the letters. Here the correlation be­
tween the two measures was r •= -0.18. Making the visual mode 
available may have relieved the Ss of the necessity to 
mentally manipulate information. 
A similar paradigm was used by Frandsen and Holder 
(1969) who used the DAT test of Spatial Reasoning and a va­
riety of verbal problem solving tasks, which included 
syllogisms, time-rate-distance problems, and logical 
deduction problems. They found a correlation between spatial 
test scores and verbal problem solving scores of r = .56. 
This correlation decreased in magnitude but remained 
statistically significant after partialing out DAT Verbal 
Reasoning scores. Half of the Ss in each of the two extreme 
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groups, in terms of performance on the spatial test, received 
instruction on diagramatic techniques of representing data 
and conditions in the verbal problems. In a problem solving 
post-test only the group lot# in spatial-visualization 
aptitude profited from instruction in diagramati; representa­
tion, reaching the performance level of the high-aptitude 
group, which did not show any reliable pretest-posttest 
change. Apparently, training in concrete diagraming 
techniques did not add to what the high-aptitude Ss could ac­
complish mentally. 
A clue as to how spatial abilities may be related to the 
mental anagram solving task is provided by Furby (1971), 
While performance in nonsense anagram tasks correlated 
reliably with measures of spatial visualization, word anagram 
performance did not. The meaningful unit of a word provides 
a readily available means of organization of the to-be-
manipulated letter sequence. This means of organization not 
being available in the nonsense condition, some Ss might have 
tried to store a visual-spatial representation of the letter 
string. 
Such a visual-spatial representation of a sequence of 
symbols appears to have been used by Ss in a "keeping-track" 
task (Monty, 1968). Subjects were to observe and mentally 
tally the number of occurrences of each of four different 
stimuli or stimulus categories presented sequentially. Per­
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formance in this task was greatly facilitated if spatial en­
coding cues were provided, e.g. four adjacent windows, one 
for each class displayed with a constant class-window rela­
tionship. Error rates were more than twice as high when the 
class-window relationship changed randomly or the same stimu­
lus sequence was displayed on one window. Monty and Karsh 
(1969) used this "spatial window" model ia a keaping-track 
experiment involving auditory stimuli which were either 
pitch-ordered or unordered. Error rate was much higher for 
the unordered stimuli. The authors conclude that spatial en­
coding can play a role in short-term memory irrespective of 
the stimulus modality employed. 
In an investigation of Ss* performance on linear 
syllogisms DeSoto, London, and Handel (1965) find results 
consistent with their hypothesis that in reasoning about or-
derings of elements, people rely on spatial representations 
or thought models. According to this view, the premises are 
interpreted and combined in a unitary, visual-image represen­
tation in two-dimensional space. After positioning the to be 
compared elements in this representation on the basis of the 
premises, the conclusion is read out from the image. While 
supportive evidence for an image theory of propositional 
thinking is provided by Handel, DeSoto, and London (1968) and 
Huttenlocher (1968), it has been contested recently by Clark 
(1969), who proposes a linguistic theory on the basis of his 
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own data. Mason and Jotinson-Laicd (1972) review evidence 
reconciling the two theories. Subjects unfamiliar with the 
task behave more according to the image theory, but after a 
few trials they appear to change to more efficient strategies 
which are consistent with the linguistic theory of 
propositional thinking. 
Playing chess appears to be another task whsre the ma­
nipulation of spatial-relational information is crucial. 
Chase and Simon (1973) conclude on the basis of recall of 
briefly exposed chess positions that experienced players 
store a large number of patterns of chess pieces in long-term 
memory in terms of their spatial and functional relation­
ships. 
Several recent studies deal more specifically with the 
nature of spatial representations and the processes operating 
on them. Shepard and Metzler (1971) presented Ss with 
perspective line drawings of rectangular structures composed 
of cube elements extending in 3 dimensions. The Ss had to 
decide whether two simultaneously presented pictures repre­
sented the same structure in two versions differing in degree 
of rotation or whether the two line drawings could not be 
matched. Reaction time was found to be a linear function of 
rotational discrepancy between the two stimulus figures. For 
matching pairs, very nearly the same slopes obtained for ro­
tation in the frontal and in the horizontal depth plane. 
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These data suggest the existence of an isotropic "working 
store" in which spatial representations can be mentally 
"rotated". In Shepard and Metzler's study spaed of "rota­
tion" averaged about 60 degrees per second. Data by Sekuler 
and Nash (1972) suggest that this variable may be a function 
of stimulus complexity. Cooper and Shepard (1973) presented 
line drawings of letters and digits as the to-be-compared 
stimuli in sequence. The two successive pictures differed in 
terms of degree of rotation of the stimulus symbol, and Ss 
had to decide whether the second symbol was the same as the 
first or its mirror image. Reaction time again was a 
monotonie function of rotational discrepancy, and in addi­
tion, of the duration of the interstimulus interval if 
advance information about the orientation of the second stim­
ulus was given. Reaction times to an expected stimulus were 
approximately equal, regardless of whether the advance infor­
mation was presented in the form of a visual outline of the 
stimulus already rotated to the orientation in which it was 
to appear, in the form of a visual outline of that stimulus 
in its upright position followed by an indication of the ori­
entation in which it was to appear, or in auditory form. 
Further, Ss were able to mentally "rotate" an imagined 
letter, with speed of "rotation" paced by auditory cues, and 
thus maintain optimal readiness for the appearance of the 
second, visual stimulus. 
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These data suggest that mental images can be generated 
by Ss and that these images carry spatial information about 
shape and orientation of the imagined stimulus. This conclu­
sion is supported by Hayes (1973), who, in addition, finds 
indications that generated images carry information about 
size. 
While the potential importance of spatial 
representational systems for thinking processes is recog­
nized, and while there are a number of highly ingenious stud­
ies investigating properties of spatial processing, this re­
search, as Newell (1973) notes, does not add up to a coherent 
interpretation. While in many studies it appears plausible 
to assume that the results are due to spatial processing, 
there are no controls for verbal mediation. Further 
complications arise when visual stimulus representations are 
used and the possibility cannot be excluded that processing 
occurs on the basis of, or is influenced by, visual-
perceptual codes. This problem appears to have been neglect­
ed consistently in theoretical as well as experimental stud­
ies. Commenting on this state of affairs, Pylyshyn (1973) 
finds it unsatisfactory "...that no consideration is given to 
the possibility that cognition may be "mediated" by something 
quite different from either pictures or words..." (p.4). 
That there is reason to distinguish visual from spatial proc­
esses is evident, e.g. from the work by Bittermaa (1965). 
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However* there still is an almost complete lack of experimen­
tal evidence concerning some of the basic concepts of infor­
mation processing in the spatial representational system: 
encoding, storage, organization, and retrieval. 
Pur2ose_of_the_Investlgation 
The four experiments reported here were designed to dem­
onstrate the existence of a spatial mode of cognitive repre­
sentation that is distinct from verbal or visual codes. For 
this purpose, a general paradigm was developed and tested for 
its suitability and flexibility to study various aspects of 
the processing of spatial information. In particular, it was 
attempted to show that information can be encoded spatially, 
stored, organized, retrieved after a long-term retention 
period, and manipulated within a complex task, in terms of a 
spatial code. 
In order to isolate spatial processing, it had to be ex­
cluded that performance on the experimental tests was due to 
visual processing, verbal processing, or both. Visual proc­
essing was excluded as a contributing factor by avoiding the 
use of pictures as a mode of presentation, and of reproduc­
tion of the spatial figures by the Ss as mode of testing. 
Except for a recognition test in Experiment IV, ss never saw 
a representation of the spatial stimuli they learned. The 
presentation of the stimulus material was entirely verbal. 
The nominal stimuli in all experiments were six, one-syllable 
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direction words: up, down, right, left, in, out. Throughout 
this investigation, all experimental subjects received the 
following instructions, read by the experimenter, to imagine 
spatially extended figures on the basis of subsets of the six 
direction words; 
Your task in this experiment is to imagine an num­
ber of simple figures that I will describe to you 
and to memorize those figures. The figures look 
similar to this model (present model shown in 
Figure 1). Each figure has straight lines that are 
connected with right, or 90 degree angles. I will 
describe to you each figure in words so you can 
imagine it. The words I'll use are always selected 
from the following 6: "up, down, left, right, in, 
out". From your point of view the description of 
this (show model) figure e.g. would be: "left, 
down, out, left" (point in sequence of directions) 
or, if you read it out backward it would be: 
"right, in, up, right" (point in sequence of direc­
tions) , from your point of view. That is, each 
word corresponds to a line and each line is con­
nected with the previous line by a right angle. 
All lines have equal length. I want you to imagine 
all figures in the same orientation, so that "up-
down" (point) refers to the vertical dimension, 
"right-left" (point) to the horizontal dimension, 
and "in-out" (point) to the depth dimension. Now, 
please describe this figure (present model in new 
orientation) in terms of the same direction words I 
have used, starting here (point to one end of the 
model), and again, starting there (point to oppo­
site end of the model). For each figure you will 
learn, please keep in mind at which end its de­
scription starts. Now, let's try it without a 
model figure. I give you the directions and you 
tell me when you have constructed the figura in 
your mind. "Out, up, right, down, out". Please 
give me back the direction words describing this 
figure (S recalls). Now, start at the end-point of 
the figure and read out the directions backward. 
(Only if S recalls correctly: "in, up, left, down, 
in" at this point is this part of the instructions 
finished. If not, more examples are provided for 
training). 
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start 
1 Inch 
Figure 1. Perspective drawing of solder wire model, repre­
senting the stimulus figure "left, down, out, 
left". 
Since presentation and testing were entirely verbal, the 
identical stimulus material could be presented to control 
groups, within identical time constraints and, under the null 
hypothesis, with identical expectations concerning test per­
formance. The control Ss received instructions to learn the 
material in whatever way they preferred, without reference to 
the possibility of spatial representation. Any differences 
in performance would thus be attributable to the effects of 
the instructions. By inference, these differences would re­
flect the characteristics of spatial processing versus those 
of the spontaneously employed, most likely verbal, strate-
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gies of Ss. Thus* two different representational systems 
would be studied with the same nominal stimuli and within the 
same paradigms. 
All experiments were intended to capitalize on proper­
ties that the imagined spatial stimuli possess bat not their 
verbal counterparts. The first experiment was designed to 
test the hypothesis that a spatial code exists and is used 
under the experimental conditions chosen. Subjects learned 
one string of direction words at a time and recalled it after 
three seconds in either forward or backward order. Faster 
backward recall for the experimental than for the control 
group was expected if Ss in the former encoded the strings in 
terms of a spatial representation. 
The second experiment tested the hypothesis that infor­
mation can be stored in terms of a spatial representation. 
Again, one string was learned at a time, but recalled after a 
6- or 18-second interval, filled with either a verbal or a 
spatial interference task. If experimental Ss showed better 
recall under verbal interference than controls, and vice 
versa under spatial interference, the hypothesis would be 
supported. 
Experiment III attempted to demonstrate that the direc­
tion words in a string are organized into an integrated 
spatial stimulus under spatial instruction conditions. This 
would be inferred if subspan strings of different length 
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would be learned and retained equally veil. 
Finally, Experiment IV was designed to test the hypothe 
sis that spatial information can be retrieved after long 
periods of time and manipulated in ways unanticipated at the 
time of learning. Experimental and control subjects learned 
a paired-associate list and were either tested after one 
minute or one week for paired-associate and free recall, for 
recognition, and, in the experimental group, for their 
ability to mentally combine two spatial figures into one 
composite. 
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EXPERIMENT I 
To be sure that the behavior of Ss in an experiment is a 
consequence of their processing spatial information, it is 
necessary to assume that the experimental task cannot be ac­
complished on the basis of any other but spatial information. 
This, in turn, requires the assumption that spatial informa­
tion was originally encoded by the Ss. 
Experiment I was designed to demonstrate that the stimu­
lus material used in this study is encoded in terms of its 
spatial attributes if Ss receive mental imagery instructions 
(p. 10). The Ss received twenty trials in a modified Brown-
Peterson short-term retention paradigm. Each trial consisted 
of presentation of a string of words, selected from the set 
(up, down, left, right, in, out) at a 2-sec. rate, a 3- sec. 
retention interval, and a period for recall. One half of the 
trials had 3-word strings, the other half 4-word strings. 
Two groups of Ss received the identical tape recorded presen­
tation of the stimulus material and were expected to produce 
identical recall under the null hypothesis. The groups 
differed with regard to the instructions for learning the 
stimulus material. The experimental group (E) received in­
structions to spatially encode the stimulus material, i.e. to 
V 
transform each string of direction words into an imagined 
spatial figure (p. 10). The control group (C) received stan­
dard verbal learning instructions (see Method section). 
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Two modes of recall were employed: Forward and backward 
recall. In the forward mode Ss would repeat the same words 
in the same order as presented. Correct backward recall 
would consist of transforming each direction word into its 
opposite term, e.g. "up" into "down" and, in addition, 
reversing the sequence of direction words. For example, the 
string "out, right, up" would in backward recall translate to 
"down, left, in". Forward recall should not posa any diffi­
culty to either group. Group C Ss would simply recall from 
short-term memory, while group E Ss, given effective instruc­
tions, would be expected to read out the imagined stimulus 
figure. In backward recall, Ss in group E would do likewise, 
starting at the opposite end of the stimulus figure. In con­
trast, backward recall would be much more difficult for C 
subjects, who would have to apply two transformation rules 
while remembering the to-be-recalled information. 
If Ss in the E condition do in fact encode the stimulus 
material spatially, forward and backward recall would involve 
the same processes, namely reading out an imagined stimulus 
figure. Recall performance should be equivalent for both 
conditions. However, in the C group, where recall is based 
on verbal processing, backward recall should be vastly 
inferior to forward recall. Thus, the experimental predic­
tion would be an interaction of Instructions with Recall 
Mode. This interaction should be present in both dependent 
16 
measures: Probability of correct recall and response 
latency. The response latency measure was added, since it 
was expected to be more sensitive than the recall probability 
measure, to help avoid problems of ceiling and floor effects, 
and to permit more precise predictions about performance in 
the four conditions. The lowest latencies would be expected 
in forward recall of the C group. More time would be re­
quired for reading out the spatial imagery figures than for 
dumping items from short-term memory, with forward recall 
slightly faster than backward recall, since verbal cues may 
still be available despite Ss* spatial encoding. By far the 
longest latencies should be found in the backward recall con­
dition of the C group. Here a response can only be emitted 
after two successive stages of transformation of the stimulus 
material have been accomplished. 
Met hod 
Subjects. The 16 volunteer Ss from introductory psy­
chology courses at Iowa State University were assigned to 
each of the instruction conditions according to a prearranged 
random schedule, with the restriction that the ratio of males 
to females must be constant across conditions. There were 5 
females and 3 males in each instruction condition. 
Materials,and procedure. The strings of words used were 
subsets of the following set of direction words: "up, down, 
right, left, in, out". They were selected with regard to the 
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spatial properties of the figures they describe. The 10, 
3-word strings represented a random sample of the strings 
which describe the 24 possible 3-element spatial stimuli ex­
tending in all 3 dimensions. Of course, none of these 
figures is symmetrical. The 10, 4-word strings were derived 
from an analogous random sample of 3-element items. To each 
of these one element was added, such that the resulting stim­
ulus figure would not be symmetrical and would not have two 
subsequent elements extending in the same dimension. The 
stimuli used are described in Table 3, Appendix A. The se­
quence of 3- and 4-element stimuli was randomized with the 
restriction that the first ten strings contained five of each 
type. The direction words were tape recorded for auditory 
presentation at a 2-sec. rate for the words within a string. 
Each string was followed by a silent 3-sec. interval, after 
which Ss were cued to recall either forward or backward. The 
cue for forward recall was the word "Go" which was followed 
by a 5-sec. recall interval, the cue for backward recall was 
the word "Back", followed by a 15-sec. interval. Both modes 
of recall were used equally often. They were sequenced 
randomly with the restrictions that 3- and 4-eleoent stimuli 
would be represented equally often in both recall modes and 
that either mode of recall would not occur more than 3 times 
in a row. 
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Each S was tested individually. When a S, assigned to 
the E condition, reported to the experimental room, the 
spatial encoding instructions (p. 10) were read to him and, 
in immediate succession, the following instructions: 
You will hear a recording of short lists of direc­
tion words. Each list will either have 3 or 4 
words, corresponding to figures with either 3 or 4 
lines. Each list is preceded by the word "Ready". 
Whenever you hear "Ready", you know that a 3- or a 
U-word list will follow. After the words of any 
single list you will be asked to do either one of 
the following two things: Number one: Just repeat 
the words as they were presented when you hear the 
word "Go". E.g. if you heard: "left, out, down, 
left", you would say "left, out, down, left". 
That's simple enough. Or, number two: Recall the 
list backward: Read out the figure you have 
imagined, beginning at the other end. E.g. if you 
heard: "out, down, left", recall: "right, up, in". 
If you are to recall backward, you will hear the 
word "Back" instead of "Go" after the words of the 
list. Before we start with the experiment, there 
will be some practice trials for you. I will do 
two things: record your answers and the time it 
takes you to find your answers. Please make sure 
your answers are correct. It is unimportant how 
fast you are, the important thing is to be correct. 
Do you have any guestions? Would you now please 
tell me in your own words how the experiment is 
going to go, so I know you got the idea. 
Control Ss were read the following instructions: 
This is an experiment about memorizing directions. 
You will hear a recording of short lists of words. 
I want you to listen to to these words and to 
repeat each list after a short pause. Each list 
will have either 3 or 4 words. The words are 
always selected from among the following six: "up, 
down, left, right, in, out". Each list is preceded 
by the word "Ready". Whenever you hear "Ready", 
you know that a 3- or 4-word list is to follow. 
After the words of any single list you will be 
asked to do either one of the following two things: 
Number one: Just repeat the words as they were 
presented when you hear the word "Go". E.g. if you 
/ 
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heard: "left, out, down, left", you would say; 
"left, out, down, left". That's simple enough. 
Or, number two: Recall the list backwards: What 
was "down" is now "up", what was "up" is now 
"down", and the same way with "in, out, left, 
right". In addition, change around the order of 
the words. I.e., recall the first word last and 
the last word first, but, of course, in terms of 
their opposites. E.g. if you heard "out, down, 
left" you would recall: "right, up, in". If you 
are to recall a list backwards in this way, you'll 
hear the word "Back" instead of "Go". Before we 
start with the experiment there will be soma 
practice trials for you. I will do two things; 
record your answers and the time it takes you to 
find your answers. Please make sure your answers 
are correct. It is unimportant how fast you are, 
the important thing is to be correct. Do you have 
any questions? Would you now please tell ma in 
your own words how the experiment is going to go, 
so I know you got the idea. 
After the six practice trials the tape recorder was stopped 
in order to clarify any questions S might have. The Ss' oral 
recall was recorded by E. In addition, E recorded the time 
between cueing for recall and onset of recall by means of a 
stopwatch. 
Analyses. One point was scored for each string recalled 
completely and in correct order. The recall data ware 
analyzed in a 2 x 8 x2x2 (Instruction by Subjects by 
Recall node by Complexity) analysis of variance. 
The latency data were subjected to reciprocal, square 
root, and logarithmic transformations. Among these, the 
logarithmic transformation produced the greatest homogeneity 
of variance. The log transformed data were analyzed in a 2 x 
8x2x2 (Instruction by Subjects by Recall Moda by Complex­
20 
ity) analysis of variance. An analogous analysis with 
unequal cell frequencies was performed on the log transformed 
latencies for correct responses only. 
Results and Discussion 
Recall_data. The prediction that E Ss would recall at a 
higher level than C Ss in the backward recall condition was 
borne out (Figure 2). The probability of correct backward 
recall was .81 for E and .68 toe C Ss, t(1U) = 2.95, £ < ,05. 
No such recall advantage was obtained in forward recall 
(.89, . 86), there was no significant main effect of Instruc­
tion, and the predicted Instruction by Recall Mode interac­
tion vas not present. 
• £ Group 
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*1 
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Figure 2. Probability of forward and backward recall 
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The summary of the analysis of variance for the recall data 
is shown in Table 9, Appendix B. 
Since the instructions for both groups advised Ss ex­
plicitly to emphasize precision of recall and to disregard 
E's recording time, the results may indicate that Ss followed 
this aspect of the instructions rather closely. However, if 
Ss did try to make sure that their responses were correct, 
differences in difficulty should appear in the latency meas­
ure. 
Latency data. The analysis of the log transformed 
latencies for correct responses (Table 1) revealed the pre­
dicted interaction of Instruction with Recall Hole, F(1,1U) = 
78.92, £ < .001. 
While response latencies are not different for E and C 
Ss in forward recall, backward responses are considerably 
faster in the E than in the C condition. Figure 3 shows that 
this relationship holds for correct response latencies as 
well as for correct plus incorrect latencies. The summary of 
the analysis of the correct plus incorrect response latency 
data is shown in Table 10, Appendix B. Since the two analy­
ses do not differ in any crucial aspect and latencies of 
correct responses pose less severe problems of interpreta­
tion, the discussion will be limited to correct response 
latency data. 
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Table 1. Summary of analysis of variance of log latency of 
correct responses only. Experiment I. 
Source of variation Degrees of Mean F values 
freedom squares 
Instruction (Inst) 
Ss 
1 
14 
0.5745 
0.1891 
3.038 
Recall mode (Mode) 
Inst X Mode 
Mode X Ss 
1 
1 
14 
6.2550 432.678*** 
1.1411 78.924»** 
0.0145 
Complexity (Com) 
Inst X Com 
Com X Ss 
1 
1 
14 
0.0509 2.262 
0.0492 2.191 
0.0225 
Mode X Com 
Inst X Mode x Com 
Residual 
1 
1 
186 
0 .0016  
0.0075 
0.0174 
0.094 
0.429 
*** 2 < .001 
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Figure 3. Latencies for forward and backward recall, a. 
correct responses only, b. correct ani incorrect 
responses. 
Although it can be assumed that there is a trade-off between 
accuracy and speed of response, the present data demonstrate 
that the faster responses of E Ss in the backward condition 
were not obtained at the expense of accuracy. Both dependent 
measures show E Ss to be superior in backward recall. This 
superiority is not trivial; while being more precise, E Ss 
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are almost twice as fast (1.7 sec.) as C Ss (3.0 sec.) in 
backward recall. 
The only difference in the experimental treatment of 
groups E and c was in terms of the instructions read to Ss. 
If it is assumed that the results obtained are due to the 
difference in instructions, this constitutes a case where E 
determined organization of information is clearly superior to 
Ss* own organizational strategies. However, Ss apparently do 
not use spatial encoding strategies consistently as the in­
structions for the E group suggest. If they did, forward and 
backward recall should be equally fast. Figure 3 shows that 
this is not so: forward recall is faster, t(1U) = 10.40, £ < 
.001. Whether some Ss encode spatially while others fail to 
do so or whether there is a verbal component involved in all 
Ss' processing of the stimulus information cannot be decided 
on the basis of the present data. 
25 
EXPERIMENT II 
The results of Experiment I suggest that under different 
instructions Ss use different types of encoding for the same 
material. In particular, the finding that E Ss accomplish 
the transformations necessary for backward recall almost 
twice as fast as do C Ss, is most parsimoniously explained by 
assuming that the E Ss have recoded the stimulus words into 
spatial representations. However, it cannot be excluded that 
E Ss, guided by their instructions, invented nonspatial 
mediation schemes that were more efficient than those adopted 
spontaneously by C Ss. 
Another interpretation is discussed by Hayes (1973). 
Since an image can be generated, it also can be regenerated. 
It may thus not persist as image at all, but be regenerated 
on the basis of an identifying code when needed in a problem 
solving or recall situation. 
Experiment II was designed to test the hypothesis that 
Ss in the spatial instructions condition (group E) store a 
spatial representation of the stimulus material, while Ss in 
the control group (C) store a verbal representation. 
The Ss received 32 trials in a Brown-Peterson short-term 
retention paradigm. Each trial consisted of the presentation 
of a string of 3 words selected from the set (up, down, left, 
right, in, out) at a 2-sec. rate, a retention interval filled 
with a distractor task, and a 10-sec. period for recall. 
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Half of the retention intervals were of 6 sec. duration, half 
of 18 sec. duration. Factorially combined with duration of 
the retention interval was the mode of the distractor task. 
Half of the intervals were filled with a verbally interfering 
task, half with a spatially interfering task. Two groups of 
Ss received the identical tape recorded presentation of the 
stimulus material and, under the null hypothesis, were ex­
pected to produce identical recall. The groups differed with 
regard to the instructions for learning the stimulus material 
in the same way as in Experiment I. 
If E Ss store a spatial representation of the stimulus 
material, their recall performance should be higher than the 
C Ss' performance under verbal interference conditions. 
Conversely, C Ss who are assumed to encode auditory-verbally, 
should perform better than E Ss under spatial interference. 
This should result in an Instructions by Interference inter­
action. 
In the C group, Ss have to memorize 3 discrete words 
while E Ss, given effective instructions, have only to 
remember one integrated stimulus figure that they can read 
out at recall. Overall recall performance should be superior 
in the E group, in accordance with findings of Murdock (1961) 
who demonstrated that, in the same paradigm, single words 
were far better retained than consonant trigrams. 
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Both effects should be more pronounced at 18 sec. than 
at 6-sec. intervals. The verbal interference condition in 
the C group should replicate Burdock's (1961) and Peterson 
and Peterson's (1959) results concerning retention of 3-item 
strings. 
Method 
Subjects. The 20 volunteer Ss from introductory psy­
chology courses at Iowa State University were assigned to 
each of the instruction conditions according to a prearranged 
random schedule with the restriction that the ratio of males 
to females must be constant across conditions. There was an 
equal number of males and females in each group. 
Materials and procedure. The words making up the 3-item 
string to be recalled were selected from the following set of 
direction words: "up, down, right, left, in, out". They were 
selected with regard to the spatial properties of the figures 
they describe. The 16 3-word strings were drawn randomly 
from the 24 possible strings which describe a 3-element stim­
ulus figure extending in all 3 dimensions (Table 4, Appendix 
A). Each of the 16 strings was used in both interference 
conditions. The direction words were tape recorded for 
auditory presentation at a 2-sec. rate. 
Two seconds prior to the first word of a string, Ss 
heard the word "Ready", A three-second interval followed the 
last word of each string. At this time Ss were sued for the 
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interference tasks. The verbal interference task consisted 
of shadowing words presented auditorily from the tape 
recording at a 1-sec. rate. The words were a random selec­
tion of nouns with A and A& ratings from the Thorndike-Lorge 
(1944) word book. The cue for the verbal interference task 
was simply the presentation of the first noun to be shadowed. 
Figure 4. Spatial interference task. Experiment II, a. 
to-be-copied drawing, b. drawing copied correctly 
into dot matrix (a. and b. original size). 
A tone signaled the beginning of the spatial interference 
interval and served cue for S to turn over the topmost 
card in a stack of 3 by 5 inch file cards. On the cards were 
drawn nonsense figures composed of straight lines and con­
nected with right angles (Figure 4a). The S*s task was to 
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copy these figures upside-down into a matrix of points such 
that the corners of the figures matched points in the matrix 
preserving the proportions of the figure. Figura 4b shows a 
correct copy of the line drawing in Figure 4a. No S was able 
to carry out this task correctly and completely in the course 
of the 18-sec. interval. This distractor task was similar to 
the one used by Brooks (1968). However, instead of his 
block-letter diagrams, nonverbal material was used in an at­
tempt to minimize verbal interference. It also appeared de­
sirable to have a scorable record of S's performance in the 
spatial interference task. The inclusion of a very similar 
task in the Newcastle Spatial Test (see e.g. Vandenberg, 
1969) and the observation by French (1951) that pattern 
copying loads on space factors support the assumption that 
the present task is suitable for producing spatial interfer­
ence. 
Either 6 or 18 seconds after the beginning of the inter­
ference interval the word "Go" signaled the start of the 
7-sec. recall interval. The sequence of types and durations 
of delays was randomized with the restriction that no repeti­
tion of a stimulus would occur with a lag of less than four. 
Each S was tested individually. The experiment was in­
troduced as being about memorizing instructions. Subjects 
who were assigned to the E condition were read the spatial 
encoding instructions cited on page 10. Immediately 
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afterwards they received the following instructions, which 
were the same for C Ss, except where stated otherwise. 
You'll hear a recording of short lists of words. 
Each list will have 3 words, corresponding to 
figures with 3 lines. (The last sentence was re­
placed for C Ss by: "Each list will have 3 words, 
selected from among the following 6: 'up, down, 
right, left, out, in*. I want you to listen to the 
words and to repeat each list after a delay of sev­
eral seconds. It is important that you keep the 
words in each list in the order you heard them.) 
Each list is preceded by the word "Beady". Whenev­
er you hear "Ready", you know that a 3-word list 
will follow. After each list there will be a delay 
before you repeat the words of the list. You will 
be asked to do either one of two different tasks 
during this delay. Both are designed to make 
remembering a little difficult. Number one: 
You'll hear simple, familiar words during the 
delay. I want you to listen to these words and to 
repeat each word aloud, immediately after you hear 
it. Try not to miss any of them. This goes on 
until you hear your signal for recall of the direc­
tion words. Your recall signal is the word "Go". 
Or, number two: After the 3 direction words you'll 
hear a beep. Turn over the topmost card (demon­
strate) and start copying the figure you find on 
this card upside-down into this dot matrix. (At 
this point in time Ss are handed a sheet for 
practice and one for the experimental trials, see 
Figure U. The latter sheet contained four more 
dot matrices than necessary, in order to prevent S 
from anticipating the type of task in the last in­
terference interval.) Do it as fast as possible 
but make sure that each corner of the upside-down 
drawing hits the corresponding dot (demonstrate). 
Stop copying when you hear the word "Go" and repeat 
the three direction words. While you are copying, 
you'll again hear words from the tape recording. 
Try to ignore them as best you can. Before we 
start the experiment, you'll get several practice 
trials to familiarize yourself with the task. Do 
you have any questions? Would you now please tell 
me in your own words how the experiment is going to 
go, so I know you got the idea. 
After the six practice trials the tape recorder was halted in 
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order to clarify any questions, S might have. 
Analysis. One point was scored for each string recalled 
completely and in correct order. The data were analyzed in a 
2 X 10 X 2 X 2 (Instruction by Subjects by Interference by 
Duration) analysis of variance. 
Results and Discussion 
As predicted, the two interference conditions affected 
the E and C Ss differently, F(1,18) = 12.49, £ < .001. The 
summary of the analysis of variance of the error scores is 
presented in Table 2. Experimental Ss made more mistakes 
under spatial interference than did control Ss. The opposite 
tendency was found in the verbal interference condition 
(Figure 5) . The spatial interference data are compatible 
with the hypothesis that mental images may not persist but 
instead are reconstructed on the basis of another, most like­
ly verbal code. The higher error rate for E Ss may reflect 
just that. However, the verbal interference lata are clearly 
incompatible with this view. Assuming a verbal basis for 
regeneration of the spatial images, one must expect that such 
a memory code is affected by verbal interference in much the 
same way as the code used by C Ss, In addition, the cogni­
tive load connected with the recoding operations should 
result in further raising error scores. 
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Table 2. Summary of analysis of variance of errors. 
Experiment II. 
Source of variation Degrees of Mean F values 
freedom squares 
Instruction (Inst) 1 0.3062 0.337 
Ss 18 0.9083 
Interference (Intf) 1 2.0250 7.026* 
Inst X Intf 1 3.6000 12.492*** 
Intf X Ss 18 0.2881 
Duration 1 0.8999 8.938** 
Inst X Duration 1 0.1000 0.993 
Duration x Ss 18 0.1006 
Intf X Duration 1 0. 3062 1.604 
Inst X Intf X Duration 1 0. 1562 0. 818 
Residual 578 0.1909 
* £ < .05 
* *  2  <  .01  
* * *  2  <  .001  
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Figure 5. Percent error under spatial and verbal interfer­
ence. 
If a verbal code is excluded as the substrate of storage, the 
most likely alternative appears to be a spatial-relational 
code. 
It might be suspected that the higher error scores of E 
Ss in the spatial interference condition were due to their 
working harder at the spatial interference task and not to 
modality-specific interference. However, an analysis of the 
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figure copy output of both groups reveals that they produced 
a similar quantity. The number of corners drawn by each S 
during his 16 spatial interference intervals wera counted. 
On the average, E Ss produced 73.4, C Ss 92.5 corners. This 
difference is not reliable, t(18) = 1.70. It is concluded, 
therefore, that the difference found in the spatial interfer­
ence condition is due to the intended experimental manipula­
tion. 
The predicted overall recall superiority of the E group 
vas not obtained (Table 2). This would argue against the 
hypothesis that spatial coding involves chunking of elements 
into unified entities, analogous to Murdock's (1961) demon­
stration that 3-letter words are considerably better retained 
over comparable intervals than are CCC trigrams. However, 
several factors might have prevented any recall advantage due 
to chunking from being discernible in the present experiment. 
With very few exceptions, E Ss commented spontaneously on 
their being unfamiliar with this kind of task and on its an­
ticipated or experienced difficulty. No such complaints were 
voiced by C Ss, except for comments concerning tie interfer­
ence manipulations. This might indicate greater difficulty 
of the spatial encoding task, possibly due to the necessity 
of expending more cognitive resources for initial learning. 
Farther, some Ss spontaneously discovered ways of spatially 
encoding the stimulus material and one S reported having used 
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both, auditory-verbal memory after the 6-sec., and 
predominantly spatial imagery as a basis for recalling after 
the 18-sec. interval. He made only one mistake in each in­
terference condition. Also, in the E group not all Ss may 
have followed the instructions consistently. The rather high 
error rate for E Ss under verbal interference suggests a 
verbal component in these Ss' memory representations. Howev­
er, it is difficult to estimate just how large this component 
may be since there was a greater overall number of errors in 
the verbal interference condition, F (1,18) = 7.03, g < .05. 
Although there are several procedural differences, the 
data of the control group in the verbal interference condi­
tion could be expected to replicate the results obtained by 
Hurdock (1961) for retention of word triads. For the 6-sec. 
interval Hurdock found that 39 % of the word triads were 
recalled correctly (s = 23 %). In the present study it is 
43.8 % (s = 15.4 X). However, for the 18-sec. interval, 
Hurdock found 23 % correct recall (s = 16 55, n = 24) , while 
retention in the present study is 46.9 % {s = 21.4 %), a dif­
ference reliable with t(32) = 3.18, g < .01. This failure to 
replicate might be due to the persisting availability of mem­
ory for imagery, invented spontaneously by Ss. In Burdock's 
experiment this factor was not present since he used 3-letter 
words selected from the most frequent Thorndike-Lorge words 
instead of the more suggestive direction words. 
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Figure 6. Percent error under spatial and verbal interfer­
ence, a. 6-sec. interference interval, b. 18-sec. 
interval. 
Figure 6 shows the Instruction by Interference interaction 
separately for the two retention intervals. It is apparent 
that the longer interval reduces overall retention, F(1,18) = 
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8.94, £ < .01. Counter to expectations, at 18 sac. the dif­
ference between the E and C group under verbal interference 
is smaller than at 6 sec. and does not reach significance as 
it does at 6 sec. with t(18) = 2.35, £ < .05. This appears 
to be due almost exclusively to higher recall of the C group, 
for the possible reasons already mentioned. 
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EXPERIMENT III 
If Ss encode the verbal stimulus material under spatial 
instruction conditions in terms of an integrated, imagined 
figure, this could be regarded as one kind of chunking 
(Miller, 1956). That chunking occurs in the visual-
perceptual mode is suggested in work by deGroot (1965). He 
found that chess masters were able to reconstruct a 
legitimate chess position almost perfectly after viewing it 
for only 5 sec., while less highly rated players were consid­
erably less proficient at this task. Assuming a memory span 
of between 5 and 7 chunks (Miller, 1956), one chunk must con­
tain 4 or 5 pieces on the average in the recall of a 
constellation with, say, 25 pieces. Chase and Simon (1973) 
replicated deGroot's findings, their evidence suggesting that 
the chunks are typically local clusters of pieces of the same 
color that usually defend each other. Thus, the relevant 
clustering dimensions appear to be visual as well as spatial-
relational. The latter dimension may well be the most impor­
tant, since after about an hour of practice an experienced 
chess player achieved the same recall performance if instead 
of a chess board he was presented with a diagram which repre­
sented the pieces by capital letters (Chase & Simon, 1973). 
Remembering a chunk should be about equally difficult regard­
less of the number of elements in the chunk. In other words, 
a stimulus figure consisting of three elements should be re­
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tained as easily as a five-element stimulus figure, provided 
the information content does not exceed the limits of what 
can be incorporated into a chunk. Experiment II did not sup­
port the chunking hypothesis since recall was not higher in 
the spatial instruction condition than in the control condi­
tion. 
Experiment III was designed to provide a stronger test 
of the chunking hypothesis. The Ss were presented with an 
8-item paired-associate list which they were to learn to a 
criterion of 3 subsequent perfect trials by means of the an­
ticipation method. Each paired-associate item had a noun as 
stimulus term and as a response term had a string of direc­
tion words, selected from the following set: "up, down, 
right, left, out, in". The stimulus nouns were selected for 
high concreteness, high meaningfulness, and low frequency, in 
order to facilitate list learning. The Ss were instructed to 
form spatial images of the direction words. Half of the re­
sponse terms were 3-element stimuli, the other half were 
5-element stimuli. Pairing with stimulus terms was counter 
balanced. If the instructions induced Ss to spatially encode 
all response strings, there should be no difference in the 
number of trials to three subsequent correct recalls for in­
dividual 3-element and 5-element stimuli. 
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Method 
Subjects. The 6 Ss were volunteers from introductory 
psychology courses at Iowa State University. 
Materials and procedure. The 8 stimulus words of the 
paired associate list were selected from the Paivio, Yuille, 
and Madigan (1968) norms. All words fulfilled the following 
criteria: Concreteness > 6, meaningfulness > 5, frequency < 
10, The response terms were strings of direction words, se­
lected to represent the figures described in Table 5, Appen­
dix A. Each S was tested individually. The Ss received the 
standard spatial imagery instructions and then the following 
additional instructions, specific to the paired-associate 
task: 
Each figure you will learn has been given a name. 
Your task is to learn the figure that goes with 
each name, so that you can give me the directions 
describing a figure when I give you its name. 
Always report the directions in a forward manner as 
I gave them to you. E.g. if the name of this 
figure (show model in Figure 1) was "hurricane" and 
I said to you "hurricane", you would, repeat: "left, 
down, out, left". "There will be 8 such name-
figure pairs. At first, I will give you each name 
with its corresponding figure once. Then 1*11 only 
give you the name and have you repeat the direc­
tions of the figure that go with it. After you 
have tried to describe the figure I'll give you the 
correct description again. We'll go through all 
the word-figure pairs as often as is necessary for 
you to learn the pairs completely and remember them 
reliably. Do you have any questions? 
First, the entire stimulus list was read once to tha Ss. 
After the reading of each stimulus terra the direction words 
were read at a 3-sec. rate, followed by a 10-sec. silent in­
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terval which was to give S the opportunity to construct the 
spatial stimulus, link it with the stimulus term, and do 
whatever might be appropriate for memorizing. 
In each of the following trials E read a new random 
permutation of the original sequence. After the reading of 
the stimulus term there was a 10-sec. recall and anticipation 
interval. If Ss produced the correct response, i.e., all di­
rection words in the same order as presented, they received 
verbal reinforcement without repetition of the response 
string. Reinforcement consisted of E's saying "that's it" 
when S first produced the correct response to a stimulus, and 
on subsequent correct responses E simply said "Yas". If the 
answer was incorrect, the string of direction words was re­
peated at a 3-sec, rate with a 10-sec. silent interval fol­
lowing. 
Analysis. For each S the number of trials to criterion 
were averaged for 3-eleaent items and for 5-element items, 
respectively. These scores were compared by means of a t-
test for paired samples. 
Results_and_Disçussion 
The hypothesis that 3-element and 5-elemant items were 
learned and remembered with equal ease had to be rejected. 
Items with 3-eleaent responses needed fewer trials to cri­
terion than items with 5-element responses (5.42, 6.58), t(5) 
= 3.72, £ < .05. However, there were substantial individual 
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differences in the overall rate of learning. Tha fastest S 
reached the first of three subsequent perfect trials after 5 
trials, the slowest S after 10 trials. There were also 
reports by some Ss that they had difficulties adapting to the 
unfamiliar task of spatial imaging and that they first tried 
verbal memorization. It appeared that it was these Ss who 
took longer to accomplish the learning task. Consequently, 
there was the possibility that to the extent that Ss relied 
on verbal encoding there emerged differences in the learning 
rate between 3- and 5- element items. To the extent that 
verbal encoding was used, it would be expected that overall 
speed of learning was reduced, since it would be much harder, 
if not impossible in the time available, to form well inte­
grated, verbally encoded chunks on the basis of the list ma­
terial. Thus, speed of learning should be correlated with 
the difference in learning rate for the two levels of item 
complexity. 
For each S, the number of trials to criterion was deter­
mined for each individual item. These values were averaged 
for the 3- and the 5-element items separately. The differ­
ence between these two averages was computed for each S. The 
difference scores were correlated with the overall number of 
trials to criterion; the number of trials it took for all 
eight items to be learned to three successive correct 
recalls. The resulting correlation was r = .87, df = 4, £ < 
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.05. Since it cannot be determined to what extent the as­
sumption of independence of errors is violated in computing 
this correlation coefficient, it should be treated as a de­
scriptive statistic. On this level it indicates clearly, 
however, that those Ss who learned faster also showed less 
difference in learning time for the two kinds of items. The 
two fastest learners showed an average difference of .5 and 
0.0 trials, respectively, for learning 3-element vs. 5-ele-
ment items. Apparently, the more Ss made use of spatial en­
coding, the more they integrated the stimulus words into 
chunks, and the more efficient was their learning. 
Experiment III also demonstrated that Ss are able to 
learn spatial information and retain it on a long-term basis. 
After reaching criterion, five Df the six Ss were asked to 
recall the stimulus figures backward. Four Ss recalled all 
eight figures error free, and the fifth S made only one 
mistake. For some of the figures the time between Ss* last 
forward recall and final backward recall well exceeded one 
minute. Backward recall was rather fluent, suggesting that 
spatial readout, rather than a two-step verbal transforma­
tion, was involved in recall. 
EXPERIMENT IV 
The results of Experiment III suggest that Ss are able 
to retain information in spatial form for at least one 
minute. Further, other, informal, experiments conducted by 
the author indicate that spatial information can be stored 
with little decrement over a period of time of at least a 
month. 
Experiment IV was designed to formally investigate re­
tention of spatial information over a one-week period. It 
was hypothesized that at the end of this period spatial in­
formation could be retrieved and manipulated in ways not an­
ticipated at the time of encoding. In the context of this 
experiment, Ss were expected to be able to remember individu­
al spatial stimulus figures and combine them to form new 
composites at the end of the retention period. In order to 
identify spatial stimulus figures without reference to their 
specific spatial properties, which might spuriously enhance 
retention, Ss learned a list of paired-associates with 
strings of direction words (selected from the set: Dp, down, 
left, right, in, out) as responses and words of high 
concreteness and low intralist similarity as stimuli. 
There were two conditions of instruction. In the 
spatial instruction (E) condition Ss were asked to imagine 
spatial figures (p. 10) on the basis of the string of direc­
tion words which served as responses. Recall was to be based 
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on a readout of the imagined figures. The list of four 
paired-associate (PA) items *as learned by means of the an­
ticipation method to a criterion of 3 subsequent perfect 
trials. The Ss in the control condition (C) received stan­
dard verbal learning instructions. Since Experiment III in­
dicated that there are considerable individual differences in 
speed of acquisition under spatial visualization conditions, 
the control Ss were yoked with the experimental Ss. For each 
E S there vas a C S with an equal number of anticipation 
trials to control for differences in study opportunity. Pre­
sentation of the list material was identical for both groups. 
Half of the Ss in each instruction condition were tested 
immediately after list learning, the other half received the 
same tests one week later. The Ss were first presented with 
the stimulus names of the PA items and tested for recall of 
the response terms. On the basis of Experiment III it would 
be expected that to the extent that Ss use spatial encoding 
they learn the PA list more efficiently and have better imme­
diate retention. Consequently, E Ss should show better 
recall than C Ss. This superiority of the E group should be 
more pronounced after one week, since four-item response 
terms that have high similarity should suffer more from 
intralist interference than the integrated spatial figures. 
Besides the predicted main effects of instruction condi­
tions and delay, there should be an Instructions by Delay in-
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teraction, due to more forgetting in the C condition. 
Failure to perform in the PA recall task may be due, in 
part, to loss of the S-R associations. Therefore, Ss were 
asked to free recall the response terms in a second test. To 
the extent that free recall would surpass PA recall, spatial 
information would be available but not accessible through the 
stimulus cues. Free recall scores were expected to follow 
the same general pattern as PA scores. 
Following free recall, Ss in the E condition were asked 
to retrieve pairs of responses, designated by E in terms of 
the corresponding stimulus names, and to mentally combine 
them to form a composite figure in a way specified by E. The 
Ss were then asked a number of questions about the composite 
figure. The questions were designed in such a way that they 
could be answered correctly only on the basis of the spatial 
properties of the composite figures, e.g. "How many lines are 
there that extend in the horizontal, vertical, depth dimen­
sion? How many points are there where just one line starts or 
ends? How many points are there where exactly 2, 3, 4, 5 
lines meet? How many points are there in total? How many 
closed loops are there, with how many lines in each loop?" 
Those Ss who failed to answer any one of these questions 
correctly were asked to describe the spatial figures they 
actually used. The final test for both the E and c groups 
consisted of a multiple choice recognition test. No predic­
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tions were made about the relative performance of Ss in 
recall and recognition, since failure to recognize may be due 
to Ss' codes of the spatial information being too dissimilar 
from the spatial representations displayed in the recognition 
test. This would be reflected in terms of the number of 
spatial figures that are recalled but not recognized. 
Method 
Subjects. The Ss were 24 volunteers from introductory 
psychology classes at Iowa State University who received 
course credit for participation. They were assigned to the 
four treatment combinations of Delay and Instruction accord­
ing to a prearranged random schedule with the restriction 
that the ratio of male to female must be constant across 
conditions. There were four females and two males in each 
Instruction - Delay treatment combination. 
Materials and procedure. The 4 stimulus words of the 
paired associate list were selected from the Paivio, Yuille, 
and Madigan (1968) norms. All words fulfilled the following 
criteria: Concreteness > 6, meaningfulness > 5, and freguen-
cy < 10. The response terms were strings of 4 direction 
words, selected to represent the figures described in Table 
6, Appendix A. 
Each S was tested individually. The E Ss received the 
standard spatial imagery instructions and then additional in­
structions specific to the PA task. These were the same in­
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structions as those used in Experiment III, except for 
mentioning 4 name-figure pairs instead of 8, asking s to de­
scribe the procedure of the experiment in his own words, and 
the following admonition to E Ss: "There is one thing I 
should mention. The most important point in this experiment 
is for you to base your recall on the figures you remember 
and not on words." 
The list material was tape recorded for auditory presen­
tation. The Ss first heard the entire list once. Three sec­
onds after the stimulus term, the direction words were pre­
sented at a 3-sec. rate, followed by a 10-sec. silent inter­
val which was to give Ss the opportunity to construct the 
spatial stimulus in the E group, or to organize the response 
string in any way in the C group, and link the S and R terms. 
During each of the following trials all items were tested in 
random permutations of the original sequence. After presen­
tation of the stimulus term there was a 10-sec. recall and 
anticipation interval. Recall was recorded by E. After the 
interval the string of direction words was repeated at a 
3-sec. rate, followed by a 10-sec. silent interval which 
provided an opportunity for Ss to memorize the material. The 
presentation of the list material in the E condition was ter­
minated upon Ss' reaching a criterion of 3 subsequent perfect 
trials. Each S in the C group vas yoked with one S in the E 
group on the basis of the number of anticipation trials pre-
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seated. 
All Ss signed up for the experiment under the impression 
that they would participate in two experimental sessions, one 
week apart. However, the immediate test group Ss were 
excused at the end of the first session and asked not to talk 
to fellow students about this aspect of the experiment. This 
was done in an attempt to prevent bias in the composition of 
the groups due to self-selection and to avoid speculation 
about the nature of an experiment that would reguire some Ss 
to participate in only one but other Ss in two sessions. The 
experiment was introduced as being concerned with the effects 
of interference on the learning of directions and that in the 
second session they would be given an interference test to 
see how their "learning today" would affect new learning to 
take place in the session one week later. 
In the immediate testing condition testing began one 
minute after the last learning trial. For the PA recall test 
a new random permutation of the stimulus terms was presented 
and Ss were to verbally recall the corresponding response 
strings. The combination test consisted of a number of gues-
tions (Table 7, Appendix A) the answers to which were weight­
ed equally. In the recognition test each correct item was 
presented together with 3 distractors. Presentation in the E 
group was in terms of perspective line drawings of the stimu­
lus figures with black lines on white background (Figure 8, 
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Appendix A). In the C group the correct string of four di­
rection words was presented together with 3 incorrect 4-item 
strings. The strings were typewritten on 3 by 5 inch file 
cards. 
Analyses. One point was scored for each direction word 
recalled in the correct position, in both the PA and the free 
recall tests. In the combination test, one point was scored 
for each correct answer and, likewise, one point for each 
correct identification in the recognition test. It was in­
t e n d e d  t o  a n a l y z e  t h e  r e c a l l  s c o r e s  i n a 2 x 2 x 6 x 2  ( I n ­
structions by Interval by Subjects by Recall Mods) analysis 
of variance with yoked pairs as observational units. Howev­
er, since there was severe inhamogeneity of variance with 
zero variance in some cells, this analysis could not be 
carried out meaningfully. Where possible, the scores from 
the combination and recognition tests were compared by means 
of t-tests across intervals and only within instructions con­
ditions. The data of an additional S were included in each, 
the E and C delayed testing groups. These additional Ss were 
run in order to make up for possible attrition of the origi­
nally scheduled Ss, but were not needed for this purpose. 
One E s was not available for enough time at the testing ses­
sion for the administration of the combination test. 
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Results and Discussion 
Initial learning. Since Ss were randomly assigned to 
treatment conditions, no difference was expected in speed of 
acquisition for groups receiving the same treatment during 
initial learning. The E group to be tested one minute after 
reaching criterion, took 12.17 trials to criterion (TTC), the 
E group to be tested after one week needed 11,71 TIC, t{11) = 
.24. A trial consisted of presentation and recall attempts 
of all four items, in a random sequence. There was also no 
significant difference in TTC between the two corresponding C 
groups (9.67, 10.14; t(11) = .30). 
The lower numbers of TTC for C Ss reflect a systematic 
bias. The yoking of C with E Ss was planned under the as­
sumption that C Ss would take longer to reach criterion than 
E Ss, consistent with the results of Experiment III. If, ia 
a yoked pair, the C S should happen to learn faster, it was 
hoped that he might tolerate some additional trials beyond 
criterion performance. Counter to these expectations, only 
in 7 out of the 13 pairs in Experiment IV did the C Ss need 
more or an equal number of TTC. In two cases C Ss reached 
criterion by 6 trials faster than their E counterparts. It 
proved to be unfeasible to sustain Ss* motivation to attend 
to the tape recording for still more trials after they had 
already recalled all items perfectly three times in a row. 
Initial learning was therefore stopped after C Ss* reaching 
52 
the criterion of three subsequent perfect trials. 
Considering the difficulties involved in using the TTC meas­
ure as baseline for estimating retention (e.g. Onderwood, 
1964) f half of the Ss in each instruction condition were 
tested initially, 1 min. after reaching criterion. It vas 
hoped that this would provide a baseline for measuring reten­
tion after one week. 
Paired-associate and free recall. One week after learn­
ing the four-item PA list, E Ss recalled 73 % of the direc­
tion words in their correct positions in the P& test and 88 X 
in the free recall test. However, this difference was not 
significant, t(6) = 2.28. The corresponding scores for the C 
group were 64 % in PA recall and 67 % in free recall. These 
and the data from initial testing are summarized in Figure 7, 
the raw data are listed in Table 11, Appendix C. The in­
tended analysis of variance could not be carried out, since 
there was severe inhomogeneity of variance, with no variance 
at all in the initial free recall of the E Ss, due to perfect 
performance. 
Comparisons of E and c scores by means of t-tests are 
ruled out because of the systematic bias in the Z group data. 
Thus, these data are not interpretable in terms of the ex­
perimental hypotheses. 
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week, a. PA recall, b. free recall, c. recog­
nition 
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Although there is apparently high retention in the E group 
over a one-week interval, it can not be concluded that it is 
specifically spatial information that is retained. The ex­
perimental Ss might recode the initially acquire! spatial 
information into a verbal-linguistic representation and use 
it as a basis for recall after one veek or as a basis for 
reconstructing the spatial code if the recall task requires 
recourse on the spatial properties of an item, as e.g. in the 
combination task. Due to the bias in the C data, lower re­
tention in this condition cannot be attributed to a less ef­
ficient verbal-linguistic code. The control group thus does 
hot serve its purpose: to show that retention at the level 
attained by the E group is not possible on the basis of a 
verbal-linguistic representation. 
A further complication in interpreting the present data 
arises from Ss' considerable flexibility in handling the PA 
learning task. At the end of the testing sessions in both C 
groups, Ss were asked how they went about memorizing the PA 
list. Without exception, the Ss with above average recall 
reported visualizing the material. A favorite example cited 
by Ss was the item with the stimulus term "Avalanche". 
Subject #21 imagined "swings in skiing" together with 
Avalanche, likewise S # 15. Subject # 10 reported 
visualizing the path of an avalanche. One S (# 28), who 
recalled below average, related the direction words to the 
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face of a clock, which he said worked fine for "up-12", 
"left-9" etc. but not very well for "in, out". 
Several suggestions for further experimentation can be 
derived from these outcomes of Experiment IV. First, it 
appears necessary to provide for a longer PA list, so that 
proactive interference has more opportunity to build up in 
the C condition. • This would require more than a 1-hour ex­
perimental session. Second, familiarization with the task 
could be achieved in a pretraining session, during which Ss 
in the E group would gain facility with spatial imaging, 
while C Ss would learn a PA list which is not conducive to 
using imagery as a mediation device, thus giving Ss in this 
group a set for verbal processing. The experimental list 
itself should contain stimulus terms that are highly avail­
able, discriminable, and not conducive to using imagery. A 
simple way to achieve this might be to select as stimulus 
terms the digit words "one" through "nine". 
Recognition. The results of the recognition tests are 
summarized in Figure 7. All group averages are significantly 
above chance level (25 %) . The smallest difference from 
chance (42 % for E Ss at immediate testing) is significant 
with t(5) = 2.72, g < .05. All other comparisons are nonsig­
nificant. An analysis of variance could not be performed on 
these data, since there is considerable inhomogeneity of var­
iance, with no variance at all in the C group tested after 1 
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min. 
It would appear to be worthwile to include the 
recognition tests in a replication of the present experiment, 
which was changed along the lines suggested above. If a sig­
nificant increase in recognition performance over, time would 
be found in the E condition, it would be interesting to in­
terpret such a finding in the context of the controversy sur­
rounding the Gestalt theory hypothesis that traces of memory 
for form undergo autonomous change over time (Riley, 1962). 
Combination test. The reliability of the 22-item combi­
nation test was estimated by means of the Kuder-Sichardson 
formula 20, r(ttj = .81. The 11 questions for each composite 
can be treated as parallel test forms and the correlation be­
tween the scores on composite 1 with the scores of composite 
2 would be an estimate of parallel test reliability. For the 
present 11-item tests this estimate was r{kJc) = .39. 
Adjusted for a test length of 22 items by means of the 
Spearman-Brown formula, r(kk)' = .56. This is likely to be 
an underestimate, since Ss were unfamiliar with the task and 
might have shown a more stable performance after more 
practice. To what extent a practice effect might have been 
present, is not clear, since the order of composites was not 
counterbalanced. The higher scores on the second composite 
might be due to differences in item difficulty besides any 
practice effect (58 %, 67 X), t(10) = 2.61, £ < .05. 
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The combination test vas used as a measure of spatial 
imagery on the basis of face validity. If performance on the 
combination test was based on the processing of spatial in­
formation, covariation with the other measures used would 
suggest the presence of spatial components in the performance 
of Ss on these measures as well. For the immediately tested 
E group, a correlation of r(4) = .89, g < .05, was obtained 
between recognition and combination scores. There was a non­
significant correlation between PA recall and combination 
test performance for the E group tested after a week, r(4) = 
.65. In the same group, free recall correlated with combina­
tion test performance with r(4) = .95, g < .01. These data 
support the hypothesis that performance of 2 Ss in both, the 
immediately and after one week administered tests, was based 
on spatial information. However, the small number of test 
items as well as the small number of Ss does not allow for 
very stable estimates of reliability and validity of the com­
bination test. The above conclusion can thus not be a strong 
one. 
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GENERAL DISCOSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The four experiments reported here attempted to show the 
existence of a memocy code which is distinct from visual and 
verbal codes. Further, it was attempted to demonstrate that 
this nonvisual, nonverbal code allows for processes of stor­
age, organization, and retrieval to occur, as well as for 
complex manipulations of information. 
In Experiment I, E Ss* superior performance in the 
backward recall task indicates that their internal represen­
tations of the strings of direction words had properties not 
possessed by the C Ss' representations, which is what the ex­
perimental manipulation had intended. That these properties 
of the E code were not the result of a more efficient verbal 
code is suggested by the differences in resistance to the two 
kinds of interference used in Experiment II. Better recall 
of E than C Ss under verbal interference with the opposite 
order obtaining under spatial interference would be 
inconsistent with any assumption of both, E and C groups, 
using the same representational system. Further, the results 
of this experiment indicate greater permanence of the code 
used by E Ss than is found in studies investigating visual 
sensory memory. Even the 5-sec, estimate for iconic memory 
duration under optimal conditions, with dark pre- and post­
exposure fields (Averbach & Sperling, 1968), falls short of 
the present retention durations. While Sperling's procedure 
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was designed to avoid any interfering influences, the present 
Ss were tested in a fully lit room and recalled after 6 or 18 
seconds of performing an interfering task. Posner, Boies, 
Eichelman, and Taylor (1969) estimated the duration of visual 
short-term memory from differences in reaction time between 
physical and name matches of pairs of visually presented 
letters and found it to have decayed after around 1.5 sec­
onds. Phillips and Baddeley (1971) criticized the former 
study for not considering that the development of a name code 
may mask the persisting visual code. Using pairs of patterns 
in a 5 X 5 matrix, to be matched after intervals of differing 
durations, they found recognition performance still declining 
after three and possibly up to nine seconds. They concluded 
that visual short-term memory can be maintained beyond three 
seconds but not beyond nine seconds. However, in the light 
of the present findings, their own results may be confounded 
by Ss' recoding of at least part of the stimulus information 
into a spatial representation on which the "same - differ­
ent" judgment was based after exposure of the second pattern. 
Thus, their higher estimate of visual short-term retention 
may reflect the contribution of a longer lasting non visual 
code, possibly of the kind studied in the present experi­
ments. 
While there was an apparent rejection of tha chunking 
hypothesis in Experiment III, due to the different learning 
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speeds for 3- and 5-eleaent responses, the secondary analysis 
provided an explanation for this difference and yielded 
results that are consistent with the hypothesis that strings 
of direction words were organized into chunks. The Ss who 
learned fastest overall were those with the smallest differ­
ence in speed of learning of 3- versus 5-element items. On 
an interpretive level this would mean that the more Ss 
treated the stimulus material as consisting of spatially ex­
tended, integrated figures, the more they benefited from the 
higher efficiency of the spatial code, an efficiency that is 
due, at least in part, to the smaller number of functional 
elements to be learned separately. 
That spatial information is available for at least one 
week after learning is evident from the performance of E Ss 
on the combination test in Experiment IV. Ihile it cannot be 
excluded that retention was mediated verbally, Ss must at 
least have retained the rules for regenerating the spatial 
stimuli and, in addition, some criteria for deciding whether 
regeneration had been accomplished successfully. The posi­
tive correlation between combination test scores with free 
recall scores in the E condition after one week supports the 
hypothesis that free recall was based on a spatial represen­
tation. 
So far, the results of the four experiments appear to be 
quite consistent, and in good agreement with the.major exper­
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imental hypotheses. However, several predictions remained 
unconfirmed. Since all predictions were based on the assump­
tion that E Ss would follow instructions closely and that C 
Ss would not spontaneously discover the spatial encoding 
mode, deviations from the predicted results may be due to not 
meeting this assumption. If so, this would require that the 
results obtained be interpretable in terms of Ss' using 
verbal modes of processing when they were expected to encode 
spatially and vice versa. Such an interpretation appears to 
be plausible. The slower speed in backward than in forward 
recall for the E group in Experiment I can be explained as a 
result of some E Ss* using verbal memory, which does not 
affect forward but would slow down backward recall. No dif­
ferences in overall performance were found in Experiment II 
between the two instruction conditions, counter to what would 
be expected if the E Ss integrated the direction words into a 
unified spatial figure. The rather high error rate of E Ss 
under verbal interference suggests that verbal mamory was 
used as a basis for recall to a considerable extent, possibly 
as a consequence of Ss* not consistently using spatial encod­
ing. Further, since retention of verbal material suffers 
greatly from an 18-sec. verbal interference interval, C Ss 
might have relied on imagery involving directions, as was 
suggested by comments of some Ss. This would explain the 
much higher than expected retention after 18 seconds under 
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verbal interference in the C group. It would also tend to 
decrease differences between E and C recall, following the 
longer retention interval, thus explaining why the predicted 
effects were not stronger after 18 than after 6 seconds. The 
role of Ss' less than complete adoption of the E instructions 
in Experiment III and their unanticipated flexibility in 
using alternative processing strategies in Experiment IV have 
already been discussed. Thus, the failure to find some of 
the predicted results does not necessarily weaken the conclu­
sions of this investigation. It must be kept in mind that 
the Ss were naive with regard to the experimental task and 
received only minimal pretraining at the beginning of the ex­
perimental session. 
From pilot experiments it was evident that the task of 
imaging spatial figures, at least according to the E instruc­
tions, was highly unfamiliar to Ss. The experiments reported 
here confirmed this impression. Most E Ss commented 
spontaneously that they doubted initially whether they would 
be able to follow instructions at alJ, and that they had to 
fight the tendency to treat the stimulus material in verbal 
terms early in the experiment. This difficulty appeared to 
decrease rapidly with practice. There is evidence that tasks 
involving spatial abilities are highly trainable (e.g.. Blade 
6 Watson, 1955) . One possibility to test whether the dis­
crepancies between predictions and results were due to devia­
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tions from expected encoding strategies, would be to provide 
for more extensive pretraining of E Ss with the spatial en­
coding task. Correspondingly, C Ss could be given a mental 
set for verbal processing. k closer match of predictions 
with results should be found if these manipulations were 
added to the experimental procedures. 
The lack of familiarity with the experimental task re­
ported by Ss might reflect a general neglect of the spatial-
relational mode of representing information in the subject 
population. Information processing in this mode would then 
be a phenomenon rather peripheral to the understanding of 
cognitive processes. However, these difficulties might be 
due to the specific, E-determined, procedure of using the 
spatial mode. This would leave open the question of the 
function of a spatial memory. Apparently, it can serve as a 
link between the verbal and visual modalities. The spatial 
images, that Ss constructed purely on the basis of verbal in­
formation, were well recognizable in terms of rather arbi­
trary visual representations (Figure 8, Appendix A). It may 
be asked to what extent a spatial-relational mode of repre­
sentation, of the kind investigated here, would be involved 
in processes of cross-modal transfer in general, as well as 
in the closely related processes of intersensory integration 
of information. The existence of a "single integrating 
framework located in the central nervous system" that could 
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handle information about positions of stimuli in space has 
been postulated by Fisher (1962, p. 321). Interference 
paradigms using interpolated tasks that specifically affect 
spatial processing may be appropriate tools for investigating 
these questions. 
There is a scarcity of theoretical models that are 
useful in research on spatial information processing. An ex­
ception is the work of Baylor (1972). He took thought 
protocols of himself solving problems from one of Guilford's 
tests of spatial visualization, the Block Visualization lest. 
Based on a logical analysis of the thought protocols, Baylor 
found it useful to define two problen spaces, an S Space 
(Symbolic Space) in which certain symbolic operations are 
carried out, such as addition, and an I Space (Imagerial 
Space) in which mental images of spatially extended struc­
tures are manipulated. The I space has the interesting prop­
erty of storing information about specific images and their 
components, while the S Space contains generic information. 
If Ss construct and manipulate spatial representations 
in an I-type space, these representations must have certain 
properties of specific, spatially extended items, such as 
size. It appears possible to test this hypothesis with the 
stimulus material used here, by means of a method developed 
by Hayes (1973) . Subjects would be instructed to visualize 
spatial figures with line segments of a certain size, e.g.. 
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as indicated by a visible scale. Subsequently, pictures of 
the same or slightly modified stimuli would be presented, 
varying in size. A minimum for reaction time in the "same-
different" judgments, found in the vicinity of the target 
size, would indicate that the spatial images had the property 
of size and would thus support Baylor's notion of an I Space 
in which tokens of spatial-relational structures are con­
structed and manipulated. 
Terms like "image" and "imaging" have been used 
occasionally in this report. It is recognize! that these 
terms are freighted with an enormous surplus of denotations 
and connotations (see e.g.. Bower, VM2\ Holt, 1972; 
Pylyshyn, 1973). However, there was no need to conduct a se­
mantic analysis in the present context, and usage of the 
"imagery" vocabulary was informal. For the purposes of this 
investigation, "imaging of spatial figures" can be conceived 
of as Ss' following E instructions and "spatial images" may 
be defined as the hypothetical products of this activity. 
Likewise, the use of the term "spatial" was not intended to 
define the nature of the representational system under inves­
tigation. This system may well be suited to represent rela­
tionships between elements in a more general manner, with 
spatial relations like "above, to the right of" merely being 
special cases. 
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Whether this system of mental representation is related 
to the psychological substrate of Monod's "imagined experi­
ence" remains an unanswered and possibly unanswerable ques­
tion. However, nothing compels us to assume that thinking 
occurs within just one or the other representational system 
or code. It would appear highly unlikely that the manipula­
tion of information, as far as thinking processes are con­
cerned, is accomplished only, or even predominantly, in terms 
of its verbal representations. Language may not be a medium 
of thinking at all but rather a device for editing and 
emitting the results of operations performed on informational 
structures at various points on a continuum, or even network, 
of codes or mental representations. Such a continuum is not 
so speculative after all, since we are forced to assume the 
existence of coding processes intervening between the slow 
waves and action potentials of receptor output, representing 
a problem situation, and the structure of the sentences 
formulating its solution, so long as we think it necessary to 
assume that an effect has a cause. 
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Table 3. List of stimuli. Experiment I. 
out, right, in, down 
right, in, up 
left, out, up 
right, out, up, out 
down, left, out 
up, right, out 
up, in, down, left 
right, in, down, in 
right, out, up 
down, left, in, left 
left, out, down, in 
right, down, out 
out, left, up 
up, in, up, right 
in, down, right 
out, right, up 
down, left, down, in 
out, up, left 
in, down, right, up 
left, down, out, up 
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Table U. List of stimuli. Experiment II. 
V 18 right, up, in 
s 18 down, out, right 
s 6 left, down, in 
V 6 left, down, out 
V 18 left, up, out 
s 6 down, in, right 
s 18 right, out, up 
s 6 up, right, out 
s 6 out, left, down 
V 18 right, in, up 
V 18 down, in, right 
s 18 left, up, in 
V 6 up, left, out 
V 18 up, right, out 
V 6 in, down, left 
V 6 right, out, up 
s 18 left, in, down 
s 18 right, up, in 
s 18 left, up, out 
V 6 out, left, up 
V 6 left, down, in 
s 6 up, right, in 
V 18 down, out, right 
V 6 left, in down 
s 6 left, down, out 
V 18 out, left, down 
s 6 in, down, left 
s , 6 right, in, up 
V 6 up, right, in 
s 18 up, left, out 
V 18 left, up, in 
s 18 out, left, up 
Column 1 refers to interference conditions: s = spatial, v 
verbal. 
Column 2 refers to duration of delay, either 5 or 18 sac. 
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Table 5. Paired-associate list. Experiment III. 
Stimulus (A) Response Stimulus 
Avalanche left, up, in Tripod 
Blister out, up, left, in, up Scorpion 
Hardwood right, up, out Poster 
Invoice down, in, up, left, down Missile 
Missile right, up, left Invoice 
Poster right, in, down, in, left Hardwood 
Scorpion up, left, out Blister 
Tri pod down, out, left, in, down Avalanche 
Each stimulus term occurs with both, a 3- and a 5-element re­
sponse term in the two counterbalancing orders (A) and (B). 
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Table 6. Paired-associate list. Experiment 17, 
Stimulus Response 
Avalanche left, down, right, out 
Hardwood out, right, down, in 
Poster right, out, up, in 
Tripod out, left, out, down 
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Table 7. Combination test items. Experiment IV 
How many lines are there that extend horizontally? 
How many lines are there that extend vertically? 
How many lines are there that extend in depth? 
How many points are there where just one line ends (or 
starts)? 
How many points are there where exactly two lines meet? 
How many points are there where exactly three lines meet? 
How many points are there where exactly four lines meet? 
How many points are there where exactly five lines meet? 
How many points are there in total? 
How many closed loops are there? 
How many lines make up the closed loop(s)? 
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Table 8. Recognition test items. Experiment 17. 
1 .  
up, left, down, in 
* left, down, right, out 
right, in, left, up 
out, left, down, out 
3. 
* right, out, up, in 
in, left, down, out 
in, right, down, in 
left, out, up, right 
2 .  
out, up, right, out 
in, right, down, left 
down, left, down, out 
* out, right, down, in 
4. 
uPf left, down, out 
out, down, right, out 
left, out, up, in 
* out, left, out, down 
* The asterisk marks the correct alternatives. 
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1. / M 7 
2. 
/ 
/ 
3. /I 
J 1/ 
J/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
4. n /Ly L 
The asterisk marks the correct alternatives 
Figure 8. Recognition test items, E group. Experiment IV 
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Table 9. Summary of analysis of variance of recall. 
Experiment I. 
Source of variation Degrees of 
freedom 
Mean 
squares 
F values 
Instruction (Inst) 
Ss 
1 
m 
0.5281 
0.3638 
1.452 
Direction (Dir) 
Inst X Dir 
Dir X Ss 
1 
1 
14 
1.3781 
0.2531 
0.0870 
15. 831** 
2.908 
Complexity (Com) 
Inst X Com 
Com X Ss 
1 
1 
14 
0.7031 
0.0781 
0.1753 
3. 987 
0.443 
Dir z Com 
Inst X Dir x Com 
Residual 
1 
1 
270 
0.0281 
0.0781 
0.1390 
0 . 2 0 2  
0.562 
*• £ < .01 
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Table 10. Summary of analysis of variance of log latency. 
Experiment I. 
Source of variation Degrees of Mean F values 
freedom squares 
Instruction (last) 
Ss 
1 
14 
1.02288 7.492* 
0.13654 
Direction (Dir) 
Inst X Dir 
Dir X Ss 
1 
1 
14 
8.72673 134.342*** 
1.59557 24.553*** 
0.06495 
Complexity (Com) 
Inst X Com 
Com X Ss 
1 
1 
14 
0.04013 1.392 
0.00075 0.026 
0.02883 
Dir X Com 
Inst X Dir x Com 
Residual 
1 
1 
270 
0.00001 0.0006 
0.05531 3.114 
0.06101 
» £ < .05 
*** £ < .001 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 11. Raw data of recall and recognition tests. 
Experiment IV. 
S # PA recall Free rec. Recognition 
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Group E (1 min.) 
1 16 16 2 
6 16 16 4 
11 16 16 1 
14 16 16 1 
17 16 16 4 
19 15 16 4 
Group E (1 week) 
2 14 14 4 
4 16 16 4 
5 8 14 4 
8 9 16 4 
18 12 15 3 
25 7 8 4 
27 16 16 3 
Group C {1 min.) 
7 12 12 4 
10 16 16 4 
13 7 9 4 
16 16 16 4 
20 16 16 4 
21 10 16 4 
Group C (1 week) 
3 12 12 4 
9 5 6 1 
12 13 13 4 
15 16 16 4 
22 10 10 4 
26 8 11 3 
28 8 7 4 
